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Price Movers on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: 





This study examines trade sizes used by informed traders. The selected sample 
includes 73 active stocks from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), a pure limit order 
market, that cover two distinct market conditions of a bull and bear market. Using intraday 
data, the study finds that large sized trades (i.e., larger than the 75th percentile) account for a 
disproportionately large impact on changes in traded and quoted prices. This finding 
compares with the results of studies conducted on U.S. markets that show informed traders 
employ trade sizes falling between the 40th and 95th percentiles (Barclay and Warner 1993; 
Chakravarty 2001). Our results support the hypothesis that informed traders on a pure limit 
order market such as the SET, where there are no market makers, are able to use larger sized 
trades than those employed by informed traders on U.S. markets. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: G12; G14; G15 
Keywords: informed traders; pure limit order market; trade size; bull and bear markets; 
Thailand 
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Price Movers on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: 
Evidence from a Fully Automated Order-Driven Market 
 
1.  Introduction 
Theoretical models about the behavior of informed traders suggest that they spread 
trades over time in order to maximize profits from their private information (Eom and Hahn 
2005; Kyle 1985)1 or by trading when liquidity is high such as during an opening period 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). However, these models do not explicitly address the choice of 
trade size used by an informed trader. For example, the models do not identify the optimal 
trade size used by these traders to hide their trades in order to protect their information from 
being revealed too quickly. Despite a large number of studies that examine the role and 
behavior of profit-maximizing informed traders, questions regarding exactly how informed 
traders trade and their trade size choices remain largely unanswered.  
Researchers (e.g., Kyle 1985) who examine informed trading suggest that profit-
maximizing informed investors attempt to hide their trades by breaking up large trades into 
smaller ones and executing them over time in order to protect their valuable private 
information.2 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest that informed traders camouflage their 
information by trading during high volume periods. Barclay and Warner (1993) propose the 
stealth trading hypothesis and argue that informed traders who want to avoid detection will 
break up their trades into several medium-sized trades because large-sized trades may have 
an excessively large price impact on the market and smaller sized ones increase the likelihood 
that their private information may be revealed too quickly. The empirical evidence from the 
                                                 
1In particular, Eom and Hahn (2005) find that the frequency of trades has a larger effect on future 
option price volatility than trade size, which supports the hypothesis that traders exercise their 
informational advantage by using a series of small-sized trades over time instead of using one large 
trade. 
2Keim and Madhavan (1995) empirically examine U.S. institutional equity trades and find that larger 
orders are usually spread over a longer period and associated with a longer trading duration. 
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NYSE (Anand and Chakravarty 2006; Anand et al. 2005; Barclay and Warner 1993; 
Chakravarty 2001) supports the stealth trading hypothesis.  
Studies on stealth trading, however, have focused primarily on U.S. markets, which 
are specialist or dealer markets (e.g., NYSE or Nasdaq). To our knowledge, none has been 
conducted on other types of markets such as a pure limit order driven market. Research that 
examines this type of trading on other markets is necessary as several studies (e.g., Boehmer 
2005; Garfinkel and Nimalendran 2003; Grammig et al. 2001; Heidle and Huang 2002; 
Huang and Stoll 1996; Lee and Yi 2001) show that the presence of market makers has a 
significant impact on the choice of trade sizes by informed traders. As a result, the 
application of the findings from stealth trading studies of the U.S. markets to other markets 
with a different structure may be questionable. The present study is intended to fill this gap 
by examining informed traders’ trade size choices in a pure limit order market (i.e., a market 
without market intermediaries). In particular, this study empirically reexamines the stealth 
trading hypothesis (Barclay and Warner 1993) in a pure limit order market.  
Our central hypothesis predicts that, in a pure limit order market, informed traders use 
larger sized trades than in the U.S. markets because there is an absence of market makers who 
might be able to recognize an informed trade. This hypothesis is based on research (e.g., 
Boehmer 2005; Huang and Stoll 1996; Lee and Yi 2001) conducted on the New York Stock 
Exchange, (NYSE), National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ), and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), that documents market makers’ 
ability to identify informed traders. These studies suggest that market structures influence 
how informed investors behave in order to hide their private information. Our empirical tests 
are based on 73 active stocks listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). There are no 
market makers operating on the SET; as a result, it provides a natural setting for examining 
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how informed traders hide their trades in a pure limit order market and comparing this 
behavior to strategies used by informed traders on markets with market makers.  
The present study’s empirical results support our main hypothesis; that is, trades in 
the top quartile of size (i.e., larger than the 75th percentile) collectively play a 
disproportionately large role in the cumulative price change and the cumulative quote change. 
In particular, they account for 168.4% (143.1%) of the cumulative stock price (quote) change 
compared to 28.3% of the total number of transactions and 80.8% of the total volume. 
Without market makers who are able to screen out informed trades, informed traders on the 
SET use relatively larger trades. This situation contrasts with the results of studies conducted 
on the NYSE (e.g., Barclay and Warner 1993; Chakravarty 2001) that show informed traders 
use trade sizes within the 40th to 95th percentiles. 
In addition, the present study examines informed traders’ order-breakup strategies 
under different market conditions, namely, bull or bear markets. Trading volume and 
liquidity will vary according to bull or bear market conditions; therefore, informed traders 
may adopt different strategies (e.g., trade sizes) in order to hide their trades under different 
liquidity conditions (Campbell et al. 2004; Keim and Madhavan 1995). In particular, this 
study hypothesizes that informed traders will use larger trade sizes during a rising market 
(i.e., market with a high liquidity) than during a falling market (i.e., market with a low 
liquidity). Our empirical results support this hypothesis.  
The remainder of this article is arranged as follows: Section 2 presents the motivation 
and background of the present study together with the development of our hypotheses; 
section 3 provides the institutional details of the SET; section 4 contains details about the 
data, the sample selection criteria used in this study, and the method; the empirical results are 
discussed in section 5; and section 6 offers some conclusions.  
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2.  Motivation, Background, and Hypotheses  
Barclay and Warner (1993) propose the stealth trading hypothesis to explain the 
behavior of informed traders. They suggest that informed traders use several medium-sized 
trades to avoid detection. Medium-sized trades should not be too small since a smaller sized 
trade delays the acquisition of the desired (larger) position, increases the likelihood that the 
private information will be revealed, and incurs a fixed cost per trade. On the other hand, if a 
large trade is not broken up, it may cause an unnecessary large price impact3 should it attract 
the attention of intermediaries or public investors. Using a sample of NYSE stocks from 1981 
to 1984, Barclay and Warner find empirical evidence supporting their stealth trading 
hypothesis.4  
Anand et al. (2005) and Chakravarty (2001) examine stealth trading from November 
1990 to January 1991 using the NYSE TORQ dataset. Their results are consistent with 
Barclay and Warner’s (1993) hypothesis and show that medium-sized trades are associated 
with a disproportionately large cumulative price change relative to their proportion of all 
trades and volume. More important, they find that institutions, rather than individuals, are the 
source for the disproportionately large cumulative price change of medium-sized trades, 
implying that institutional investors are more informed.  
Anand and Chakravarty (2006) examine stealth trading in the options market. They 
demonstrate that a significant amount of price discovery occurs through small and medium 
trades. In addition, they find that the strategic fragmentation of trades by informed traders 
                                                 
3See the theoretical model by Easley and O’Hara (1987), the empirical evidence about institutional 
equity trades by Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) and Chiyachantana et al. (2004), and the 
empirical evidence on futures markets discussed by Berkman et al. (2005), and Frino and Oetomo 
(2005).  
4In fact, they test the stealth trading hypothesis against two alternative hypotheses: (1) the public 
information hypothesis and (2) the trading volume hypothesis. 
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depends on the liquidity of options contracts. In particular, for liquid (illiquid) contracts, 
informed traders tend to use medium-sized (small-sized) trades.5  
Lee and Yi (2001) argue that different trading mechanisms can result in different 
trade size choices by informed traders. They examine the relationship between trade size and 
the extent of informed trading on options (i.e., the Chicago Board Options Exchange) and 
stock markets (i.e., the New York Stock Exchange).6 Using a sample of firms listed on both 
CBOE and NYSE from January 1989 to December 1990, Lee and Yi find that large trades are 
more informed than small trades on NYSE, whereas small trades are better informed than 
large trades on CBOE. They suggest that different trading mechanisms on the stock and 
options markets could explain these findings. In particular, as a result of the competitive 
market maker system on CBOE, large trades are not anonymous, and this feature enables 
option market makers to screen out large, informed investors more effectively. Therefore, 
large, informed traders invest on a stock market, where their large trades are more 
anonymous.  
Boehmer (2005) looks at the execution quality of stocks on NASDAQ and NYSE. He 
shows that execution costs on NASDAQ are higher (lower) than on NYSE for small (large) 
trades. This finding is attributed to differences in how informed traders submit orders.7 Large 
                                                 
5Anand and Chakravarty (2006) use a different method to compute how much each trade size category 
contributes to the total price change from the method used by Barclay and Warner (1993) and 
Chakravarty (2001). Anand and Chakravarty employ the information share method developed by 
Hasbrouck (1995, 2003). 
6Lee and Yi (2001) report that for all trades (not classified by trade size) the adverse selection 
component of spread is marginally higher on CBOE (i.e., competing dealer market) than on NYSE. 
This is consistent with the finding by Heidle and Huang (2002) that the probability of informed 
trading is higher on NASDAQ (i.e., competing dealer market) than on NYSE (i.e., auction market 
with specialists).  
7The findings by Bessembinder (2003) also support Boehmer’s (2005) argument. Bessembinder 
analyzes a matched post-decimalization sample of NYSE and NASDAQ stocks and shows that the 
NASDAQ–NYSE price impact (i.e., the adverse selection component of effective spread) differential 
declines from $0.77 for executions inside the quote (i.e., small trades) to -$3.24 for executions outside 
the quote (i.e., large trades).  
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informed orders can be detected easily by dealers on NASDAQ;8 therefore, informed traders 
tend to split their orders and submit their split orders simultaneously to several dealers. 
Boehmer suggests that small NASDAQ orders become more informed and expensive to 
execute. In contrast, large informed orders on NYSE are usually not split because split orders 
will be executed sequentially (i.e., they have large price impact costs and take too much time 
to warrant their short-lived information). Therefore, large, informed traders on NYSE tend to 
submit larger orders directly to a specialist, who, in turn, executes these orders against 
standing public limit orders9 and do not give a price improvement. On the contrary, 
uninformed small orders are chosen for execution by specialists and may be granted a price 
improvement.  
Huang and Stoll (1996) report that the adverse selection component decreases with 
trade size on NASDAQ, but increases with trade size on NYSE. They ascribe this result to 
two main reasons: first, they suggest that NASDAQ dealers know their institutional 
customers well, and they know that many large (and also medium) trades are non-information 
driven, which supports Barclay et al.’s (2003) argument that NASDAQ dealers are well 
positioned to spot large informed trades; and second, the fact that the adverse selection 
component is significant on NYSE, especially for medium and large trades, could reflect the 
role of limit orders on NYSE (i.e., public investors who place limit orders lose more to 
informed traders than specialists and floor traders).10 
Several studies focus on dealers’ and specialists’ relative ability to identify informed 
traders and compare dealers on NASDAQ and specialists on NYSE. Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran (2003) compare the degree of anonymity (i.e., the extent to which a trader is 
recognized as informed) on both NYSE and NASDAQ. They find a significant difference 
                                                 
8Barclay et al. (2003) and Huang and Stoll (1996) also support this argument.  
9See, for example, Huang and Stoll (1996) and Werner (2003). 
10Werner’s (2003) NYSE empirical evidence confirms this belief. 
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between the two markets’ average responses to insider trading, where the change in effective 
spreads as a result of insider trading is larger on NYSE than on NASDAQ. This supports the 
idea that there is less anonymity on NYSE than on NASDAQ.  
Heidle and Huang (2002) analyze firms that transfer to an alternative exchange 
structure and show that traders are more anonymous on a competing dealer market (i.e., 
NASDAQ) than on an auction market (i.e., NYSE). Their results indicate that competing 
dealers on an anonymous, electronic-screen-based market such as NASDAQ have more 
difficulty discerning informed traders from liquidity traders.11 In other words, NYSE, where 
the execution of the entire order flow goes through one specialist on the exchange floor, 
identifies informed and uninformed traders more easily than NASDAQ.  
Using German stock market data, Grammig et al. (2001) empirically analyze whether 
the degree of trader anonymity is related to the degree of informed trading by comparing the 
probability of information-based trading on non-anonymous, traditional floor-based 
exchanges to the probability of information-based trading on anonymous computerized 
trading systems. Their results indicate that the probability of informed trading is significantly 
lower on the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange than on an anonymous computerized 
trading system, which supports the hypothesis that informed traders have a preference for 
anonymous markets.  
So far, studies that examine stealth trading have focused entirely on NYSE and none 
of them have been conducted on other types of market (e.g., a pure limit order market). 
NYSE employs a hybrid trading system, including specialists and public limit orders; 
                                                 
11This finding by Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) and Heidle and Huang (2002) is inconsistent 
with that of Boehmer (2005), Huang and Stoll (1996), and Lee and Yi (2001) discussed earlier. There 
are two reasons for this discrepancy: first, the difference in relative ability between NASDAQ dealers 
and NYSE specialists discussed by Boehmer, Huang and Stoll, and Lee and Yi is conditional on trade 
size, whereas the difference in relative ability between dealers and specialists identified by Garfinkel 
and Nimalendran (2003), and Heidle and Huang (2002) is for overall sample trades (i.e., 
unconditional on trade size); and second, the sample stocks covered by these studies are quite 
different (e.g., the sample stocks in the studies by Boehmer, Huang and Stoll, and Lee and Yi are 
broader than those used by Garfinkel and Nimalendran, and Heidle and Huang).  
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however, previous studies (e.g., Boehmer 2005; Garfinkel and Nimalendran 2002; Grammig 
et al. 2001; Heidle and Huang 2002; Huang and Stoll 1996; Lee and Yi 2001) suggest that 
market structure could affect the choice of trade sizes by informed traders. The ability of 
market makers to detect informed trades plays an important role in determining the choice of 
trade sizes by informed traders. Different market architectures induce investors with private 
information to behave differently and adopt different trading strategies in order to hide their 
trades and maximize the value of their private information. The present study follows 
previous studies on U.S. markets (e.g., Boehmer 2005; Garfinkel and Nimalendran 2003; 
Grammig et al. 2001; Heidle and Huang 2002; Huang and Stoll 1996; Lee and Yi 2001) and 
argues that informed traders will be less likely to break up their trades in a pure limit order 
market because such a market has no market intermediaries and, theoretically, is fully 
anonymous. As a result, in a pure limit order market, medium-to-large sized trades tend to be 
better informed. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Under a pure limit order market, informed traders are concentrated among 
larger trade sizes.  
 
In the present study, data from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), a pure limit 
order market, is used to test Hypothesis 1. To test it, we examine the proportion of a stock’s 
cumulative price change that occurs in each trade size category and compare the proportion 
of the price change in each trade size category to its proportion of all trades and volume.12  
In addition, we examine how stealth trading operates under different market 
conditions (e.g., bull and bear markets) in order to discover whether informed traders’ trade 
size choices are influenced by market conditions. There is no a priori theory that states 
                                                 
12See Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001). 
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clearly how market conditions influence the way informed traders hide their trades in order to 
protect the value of their private information. However, we propose several reasons that 
might encourage informed investors to use larger-sized trades in a bullish market than in a 
bearish one. First, the liquidity volume is generally higher on a bullish, rather than in a 
bearish, market. Some studies (e.g., Grinblatt et al. 1995)13 suggest that momentum strategies 
are stronger in a bull market than in a bear market. Therefore, in a bullish market, it is less 
necessary for informed traders to break up their large trades because they can more easily 
hide these large trades during high liquidity volume periods. Second, Campbell et al. (2004) 
argue that institutional traders employ different size trades according to volume and 
volatility. They suggest that during highly volatile days (and, therefore, high volume days)14 
informed traders want to trade quickly and in a large size. Third, as suggested by Keim and 
Madhavan (1995), the benefits of trading over a longer horizon are largest in thin markets; so 
trade duration should decrease with market liquidity after correcting for order size. Keim and 
Madhavan point out that, during a down (up) market, when liquidity is low (high), an order 
break-up strategy is more (less) beneficial. These arguments lead to the next hypothesis: 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Informed traders are more concentrated in larger-sized trades during a bull 
market than during a bear market. 
  
Hypothesis 2 is tested with a procedure similar to the one used to test Hypothesis 1; 
that is, we examine the proportion of a stock’s cumulative price change that occurs in each 
trade size group under a bull and bear market, and then, under each market condition, the 
proportion of the price change in each trade size category is compared to its proportion of all 
                                                 
13Grinblatt et al. (1995) find that institutional investors typically buy past winners, but most of them 
do not systematically sell past losers. 
14In general, a positive relationship exists between volume and volatility (Karpoff 1987). 
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trades and volume. Again, data from SET, a pure limit order market, are used to test the 
hypothesis. 
 
3.  Market Architecture of Stock Exchange of Thailand 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) operates under an automated limit order 
trading system called the Automated System for the Stock Exchange of Thailand (ASSET). 
Trading on the SET is possible on five trading boards: main, foreign, big lot, odd lot, and 
special. Common stocks, preferred stocks, warrants, and unit trusts are traded on the main 
board, big lot board, and odd lot board. Only stocks registered under foreigners’ names are 
traded on the foreign board. Government and state enterprise bonds, debentures, and 
convertible debentures are traded on the special board. Each trading unit, called “board lot,” 
contains 100 shares of a security but, for stocks trading at 500 baht or more for six 
consecutive months, one board lot equals 50 shares. Orders of less than one board lot are 
traded on the odd lot board while orders of either more than 3 million baht or 1 million shares 
are traded on the big lot board. 
The ASSET system consists of two trading possibilities: Automatic Order Matching 
(AOM), the main system, and Put-Through (PT), the support system. The AOM system 
implements an order queuing process and arranges the orders according to a price-then-time 
priority. First, all orders are grouped according to price, with the best price taking 
precedence. Then, within each price group, orders are arranged according to time. There are 
two matching procedures: continuous order matching and call market matching. Call market 
matching is used to determine the opening price in the morning and afternoon sessions while 
all other orders placed during each trading session are subject to continuous order matching.  
The Put-Through (PT) system is a support system that records approved transactions 
negotiated privately by members. Under the PT system, members can advertise their buying 
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and selling interests on a screen provided by ASSET. Each member can then directly 
negotiate with another party, and the effective executed price may be different from that 
advertised and may not follow the price spread rules. After negotiations are concluded, 
members must send the results of the negotiated deal to the ASSET system for recording. 
However, the PT system can be used only for big lot trading, trading securities registered 
under a foreigner’s name, and trading government bonds, state enterprise bonds, debentures, 
convertible debentures, and warrants on debentures.  
ASSET allows traders to place seven order types: market order, limit order, at-the-
open order, at-the-close order, immediate-or-cancel order, fill-or-kill order, and conditioned 
published order. Market order is simply an order to buy or sell securities at the best prevailing 
price. Limit order is an order to trade at a price no worse than the limit price specified. If no 
trade occurs, the order will stand as an offer to trade in the limit order book. At-the-open 
orders and at-the-close orders are orders to buy or sell securities at the opening price or at the 
closing price. The immediate-or-cancel order is an order to buy or sell securities immediately 
at a specific price. If there is any unmatched volume, the remaining volume will be canceled. 
The fill-or-kill order is an order to buy or sell the whole ordered volume at a specific price. If 
this condition cannot be met, the order will be canceled. The conditioned published order is 
an order that allows a trader to reveal some portion of his or her order size and hide the 
remaining order from the public. The volume of a published order must be at least 10 board 
lots and indicate an equal number of shares to be published or revealed. When the revealed 
portion is transacted, the next portion is placed in the queue until the whole ordered volume is 
completely transacted. 
 
4.  Data and Methodology 
4.1.  Data 
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We retrieve the transactions data for all securities traded on SET from 2000 to 2004. 
The data are obtained from SIRCA at the Capital Markets Cooperative Research Center in 
Sydney, Australia, and these data contain a time sequence of trade and quote records. Each 
trade record contains the security name, date, time, and traded price, while each quote record 
contains the prevailing best bid and ask price. We identify two distinct back-to-back trading 
periods: one period where the market goes up (bull market) and the other where the market 
goes down (bear market). To mitigate any biases, the absolute price change of the Thai 
market index in the two periods must be as close as possible and be approximately of the 
same length.  
The following selection criteria are also applied. We pick active stocks with a 
minimum of 20 trades per day over at least 150 active trading days in each of the two sub-
periods. The first trade of the day is excluded because it represents an overnight price change 
and occurs under batched-auction trading rather than under the continuous trading that occurs 
during normal trading hours. The final sample period, which is shown in Table 1, runs from 
January 24, 2002 to October 14, 2002.15 In the first period (January 24, 2002 to June 13, 
2002), the SET index level rose from 327 to 426 (a market return of 30.3%), signifying a 
bullish market. In the second period (June 14, 2002 to October 14, 2002), the SET index 
declined from 426 to 323 (a market return of -24.2%), indicating a bearish market. In all, 93 
trading days in the first period and 82 days in the second period are identified.  
In order to maximize the chance of detecting any stealth trading activity, this study 
only examines stocks that experience significant price changes during the sample period 
(Barclay and Warner 1993; Chakravarty 2001). In particular, stocks that display at least a 5% 
increase in price over the first period and a 5% decrease in price over the second period are 
                                                 
15We also redo all of our analyses on other data periods, namely, March 2000 to October 2000 and 
November 2001 to June 2002. The findings (not reported) are similar to those of the selected periods. 
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selected.16 As a result, 73 liquid stocks, with approximately 2.5 million trades, are included in 
the final sample. Table 1 presents the overall characteristics of the sample. The equally- 
weighted returns of the sample stocks are higher, in absolute terms, than the corresponding 
market returns in both periods: 53.7% in the bull market and -52.4% in the bear market. In 
the bull (bear) market, the minimum stock return is 10.2% (-255.2%), while the maximum is 
237.7% (-5.4%). These large price changes increase the likelihood that any stealth trading by 
informed traders would be detected. Both the average market capitalization and volume-
weighted traded price are higher in the bear market than in the bull market. This could be, in 
part, because market capitalization is measured at the beginning of each period. 
 
4.2.  Methodology 
4.2.1.  Trade Size Classifications 
The first trade in the morning and afternoon sessions and the last trade of the day are 
identified and excluded from the analyses because these trades occur under a batch-auction 
trading system. The remaining trades occur under a continuous trading system during normal 
trading hours (i.e., 10.00 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and 14.30 p.m. to 16.30 p.m.) and are classified 
according to their trade size. Previous studies assign each trade according to a size category 
based on the number of shares traded. For example, Anand et al. (2005), Barclay and Warner 
(1993), and Chakravarty (2001) classify a trade size of 100 to 499 shares as small, 500 to 
9,999 shares as medium, and more than 10,000 shares as large.17 However, we do not follow 
this trade size classification procedure because our preliminary analysis suggests that trade 
                                                 
16The analyses on stocks with a price change smaller than 5% are also performed. Basically, the 
findings (not reported) for those stocks are qualitatively similar to the reported results (for stocks with 
a price change greater than 5%). 
17In fact, Barclay and Warner (1993) divide the small size category into four subcategories (i.e., 100, 
200, 300, and 400 shares) and the medium category into five subcategories (i.e., 500 shares, 600-900 
shares, 1,000-1,900 shares, 2,000-4,900 shares, and 5,000-9,900 shares). Chakravarty (2001) divides 
the medium trade size category into four subcategories (i.e., 500-999 shares, 1,000-2,999 shares, 
3,000-5,999 shares, and 6,000-9,999 shares).  
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sizes on SET are significantly different from those on the U.S. markets. The mean trade size 
of our sample stocks is 23,920 shares, while that for NYSE stocks is approximately 2,500 
shares.18 In order to deal with the difference in trade sizes and for our results to be 
comparable to those in existing studies, trade sizes are divided into percentile categories. As 
in the Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) studies, the 
present study uses seven trade size categories. For each period and each stock, all trades are 
ordered by their size in terms of the number of shares traded. In each bull and bear period, 
each firm’s trades are divided into the following seven percentile categories: (1) less than the 
25th percentile, (2) 25th to 50th percentile, (3) 50th to 75th percentile, (4) 75th to 90th percentile, 
(5) 90th to 95th percentile, (6) 95th to 99th percentile, and (7) greater than the 99th percentile. 
The share size cutoffs corresponding to each percentile band are based on each firm’s trade 
size distribution in each period. Therefore, the cutoffs vary in terms of their absolute share 
size across firms and periods. This trade size classification method is used to define the trade 
size (large, medium, or small) of each stock relative to its order flow over each of the two 
periods.19 
                                                 
18Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) report that the average trade size for their 150 NYSE common stocks 
during 1988 is 2,034, and the average trade size for all firms on NYSE in 1988 is 2,303. Chakravarty 
(2001) reports that the average trade size of the 97 NYSE firms in the TORQ database from 
November 1990 to January 1991 is 2,535. Werner (2003) reports that the average trade size of the 101 
NYSE stocks from July 1997 to October 1997 is 1,926. In Barclay and Warner’s (1993) study, the 
average trade size of the 108 NYSE tender offer target firms from 1981 to 1984 is approximately 
1,300 shares. 
19A comparison of trade sizes based on the number of shares is inappropriate because of the 
differences in prices between stocks themselves and between Thai and U.S. stocks. For example, a 
10,000-share trade may be a small-sized trade for some stocks (e.g., small-cap, low-priced stocks), but 
it could be a large-sized trade for certain stocks (e.g., large-cap, high-priced stocks). A 9,300-share 
trade is a median-sized trade for our sample stocks in Period 1; however, it is a large trade on the U.S. 
markets (i.e., it is larger than 90% in Barclay and Warner [1993] and Chakravarty [2001]). In 
addition, when the size of a trade is considered in terms of its absolute dollar value, although the 
median or mean trade sizes in shares of Thai stocks are much larger than those of U.S. stocks, average 
trade size in dollar value of Thai stocks is much smaller than the average trade size in dollar value of 
U.S. stocks. The mean trade size of our sample stocks is 23,920 shares, and the volume-weighted 
average trade price for that period is around 10.33 baht. Therefore, the mean trade size in dollar value 
is 
40
33.10920,23 ×  (where approximately 40 baht is equivalent to 1 U.S. dollar), which is nearly 
US$6,200, while the corresponding number for U.S. stocks is roughly US$57,820 (see Chakravarty 
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4.2.2.  Percentage Cumulative Price Change by Trade Size Category 
Following Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001), the present study 
defines the Price Change of each trade as “the difference between the price of the current 
trade and the price of the previous trade,” and the change in price from the first to last trade 
during each sample period for each firm (the Total Price Change) is computed. Then, for 
each stock, the trade-by-trade price changes within each trade size category are summed and 
divided by the total price change to obtain its Percentage Cumulative Price Change. Finally, 
the average cumulative price change in each trade size category is measured as the weighted 
average of the cumulative price change in each size category across the 73 individual stocks, 
where the weight of each stock is its total price change in each period.  
 
4.2.3.  Percentage Cumulative Quote Revision by Trade Size Categories 
The present study uses Cooney and Sias’ (2004) procedure and computes quote 
changes in addition to price changes. Price changes resulting from a trade are sometimes 
influenced by a trader’s impatience and not by an information advantage, which results in 
bid-ask bounce. Therefore, we propose that a better measure for the information content of a 
trade is the market’s response to each trade. As a result, the quote revision impact (i.e., Quote 
Change) is computed as the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the subsequent trade less 
the quote midpoint in effect at the time of the current trade. The Total Quote Change is the 
sum of the quote revision impact associated with each trade from the first to last trade in each 
of the sample periods. For each firm, the trade-by-trade quote changes for each trade size 
category are summed and divided by the total quote change to obtain a Percentage 
                                                                                                                                                        
2001; Lee and Radhakrishna 2000). Therefore, in order to have a meaningful comparison of trade 
sizes across markets and stocks with different price levels, the classification of trade sizes based on 
percentile ranking is adopted. 
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Cumulative Quote Revision for each trade size category. Finally, the average cumulative 
quote revision for each trade size category is the weighted average of the cumulative quote 
revisions of that trade size category across all 73 stocks, where the weight of each stock is its 
total quote change in each period. 
 
4.2.4.  Percentage of Trades and Percentage of Volume of Trades 
As in the Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) studies, the percentage 
of trades for all sample stocks during each sample period is computed as the number of trades 
in each size category divided by the total number of trades across all size categories. In 
addition, the percentage of volume of trades for all sample stocks during each sample period 
is computed as the total volume of trades in each category divided by the total volume of 
trades in all size categories. The percentage of trades and percentage of volume of trades are 
used to test the stealth trading hypothesis against the public information hypothesis and the 
trading volume hypothesis,20 respectively. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1.  Descriptive Statistics of Trade Sizes  
Table 2 presents the trading characteristics of the sample stocks according to trade 
size. During each sub-period (bull and bear market) for each stock, trades are classified into 
one of seven trade size categories. As expected, in both sub-periods, trade size, as measured 
by average and median number of shares per trade and baht volume per trade, increases with 
                                                 
20The public information hypothesis and the trading volume hypothesis are two alternative hypotheses 
to the stealth trading hypothesis. The public information hypothesis predicts that the percentage 
cumulative stock price change occurring in a given trade size category is directly proportional to the 
percentage of transactions in that trade size category. The trading volume hypothesis predicts that the 
percentage cumulative stock price change in a given trade size category is proportional to the 
percentage of the total trading volume in that category. Of course, the trading volume hypothesis 
assumes that an additional 10,000-share purchase would have the same cumulative impact on the 
stock price regardless of whether the purchase is transacted in, for example, two 5,000-share trades or 
in five 2,000-share trades. 
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the trade size percentile category. For example, in the bull market period, the average number 
of shares per trade (baht volume per trade) is 1,578 shares (15,448 baht) for the less than 25th 
percentile category and increases to 34,424 shares (356,796 baht) for the 75th to 90th 
percentile category, and to 425,307 shares (4,382,062 baht) for the largest-sized category. 
The figures are qualitatively similar in the bear market period.  
Trading activity is much livelier during a bull market than during a bear market, as 
shown by the larger daily number of trades, daily baht volume of trades, and daily number of 
shares traded in the bull market. It appears that trading activity in a bull market is 
approximately twice as dynamic as trading activity in a bear market. Furthermore, in any 
trade size category, trade size in shares (as measured by the average number of shares per 
trade or median number of shares per trade) increases as the market condition becomes more 
bullish. Table 2 shows that trade sizes are larger in a bullish market than in a bearish market, 
which suggests that informed traders prefer larger-sized trades during a high volume period 
because it is easier to camouflage their trades among a large number of liquidity traders. 
 
5.2.  Choice of Trade Sizes by Informed Traders Under a Pure Order Driven Market 
In order to determine informed traders’ trade size choices, the present study examines 
how much a stock’s cumulative price/quote change over each sample period is attributable to 
trades in each of the seven trade size categories. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the 
average percentage cumulative stock price change and the average percentage cumulative 
stock quote change in each of the seven trade size categories, the corresponding percentage of 
trades, and percentage of volume. The statistics presented in Table 3 indicate that small trades 
(i.e., those below the 50th percentile) account for an estimated -82.3%21 (-45.1%) of the 
                                                 
21The negative price change suggests that small-trade investors, on average, are picked off because 
they trade in the opposite direction to the market movement (i.e., sell in rising markets and/or buy in 
falling markets). 
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percentage cumulative price (quote) change and comprise 43.8% of the transactions and 5.4% 
of the volume traded. The trades in the 50th to 75th percentile category produce 13.9% (1.8%) 
of the percentage cumulative price (quote) change and account for 27.9% of the transactions 
and 13.9% of the volume. On the other hand, the four largest trade size categories (i.e., 75th to 
90th, 90th to 95th, 95th to 99th, and larger than the 99th percentiles) account for 168.4% 
(143.1%) of the percentage cumulative stock price (quote) change and comprise 28.3% of the 
transactions and 80.8% of the volume. As a result, the four largest trade size categories, both 
individually and as a group, appear to play a disproportionately large role in the percentage 
cumulative price and quote changes relative to their proportion of trades and volume in the 
sample.  
There appears to be no support for the public information hypothesis. Trades in the 
less than 25th percentile category and 25th to 50th percentile category produce approximately -
49.7% and -32.6% of the cumulative stock price change, respectively, but account for only 
19.7% and 24.1% of all trades, respectively. Trades in the 50th to 75th percentile category 
produce approximately 13.9% of the cumulative stock price change, but they account for 
27.9% of all transactions. Trades in the four largest categories produce 168.4% of the 
cumulative price change but account for only 28.3% of all trades.  
Despite the limited support for the trading volume hypothesis, the percentage 
cumulative price change for each of the four largest-size categories is still much higher than 
its fraction of the total trading volume. This supports the hypothesis that informed traders 
predominantly use larger trade sizes. The regression analyses in the next section formally 
tests the stealth trading hypothesis against the two alternative hypotheses: (1) the public 
information hypothesis and (2) the trading volume hypothesis. 
The results in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that on SET (i.e., a pure limit 
order market) informed traders hide trades by using larger-sized trades more often than 
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informed traders on U.S. markets, where there are market makers who are able to screen out 
informed traders. The results from the present study are compared to U.S. markets using the 
percentage cumulative price change, the percentage of trades, and the percentage of trading 
volume for each trade size category reported by Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty 
(2001) (see Table 4). Panels A and B of Table 4 show that informed traders prefer medium-
sized trades. The percentage cumulative price change for a medium-sized trade reported by 
Barclay and Warner (Chakravarty) is 92.8% (77.2%), while this category represents only 
45.7% (53.8%) of the total transactions and 63.5% (45.5%) of the total trading volume. In 
addition, informed traders only use the first three medium-sized sub-categories to hide their 
trades.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 4, trades in the 5,000 to 9,900 shares category produce 
only 7.4% of the percentage cumulative price change, but they account for 13.5% of all 
trading volume. Therefore, the percentage (i.e., 7.4%) of the price change is smaller than 
predicted by the trading volume hypothesis, which postulates that the cumulative price 
change should be proportional to the trading volume within each size category. Similarly, in 
Panel B, trades in the 6,000 to 9,999 shares category produce 6.2% of the cumulative price 
change and account for 7.7% of all trading volume. Again, the percentage (6.2%) of the price 
change is smaller than that predicted by the trading volume hypothesis. Panel A (B) indicates 
that informed traders use trades with sizes between the 50th and 95th (40th and 90th) 
percentiles.22 This finding highlights the importance of Hypothesis 1, which postulates that 
informed traders in a pure limit order market are concentrated in larger sized trade categories.  
Table 3 shows that trades in the 75th percentile and higher categories produce larger 
cumulative price changes than predicted by their fractions of the total number of trades and 
                                                 
22Trades between the 50th and 95th percentiles (see Panel A) refer to a combination of the following 
three trade size subcategories: 500 to 900 shares, 1,000 to 1,900 shares, and 2,000 to 4,900 shares. 
Trades between the 40% and 90% percentiles (see Panel B) refer to a combination of the following 
three trade size subcategories: 500 to 999 shares, 1,000 to 2,999 shares, and 3,000 to 5,999 shares.  
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trading volume in their corresponding categories. In the 75th percentile and higher categories 
(i.e., 75th to 90th, 90th to 95th, 95th to 99th, and 99th and higher percentiles), the percentage of 
the stock price change is approximately 168.4%, which is much larger than the corresponding 
fraction of the total number of trades (28.3%) and the percentage of the total trading volume 
(80.8%).  
For small trades, the percentage cumulative price changes are negative on both the 
Thai market (i.e., less than the 25th and 25th to 50th percentiles in Table 3) and the U.S. 
markets (i.e., 100 to 499 shares in Table 4). However, the negative percentage cumulative 
price changes for small trades on the Thai market are much greater in magnitude than those 
on the U.S. markets. There are two possible (but not mutually exclusive) explanations for this 
observation. First, the negative (positive) values of price or quote changes for a particular 
trade size category suggest that investors using such trade size categories are net exploited 
(informed). Therefore, the much larger negative price and quote changes associated with 
small trades on SET imply that they are more often than not picked off by large trades than 
small trades on U.S. markets. In other words, the extent to which small trades are relatively 
less informed or more liquidity-driven or exploited than large trades is larger on SET than on 
U.S. markets. Second, small trades (i.e., less than the 50th percentile) on U.S. markets are 
usually transacted within the existing quoted spread. By contrast, small trades on SET are 
always transacted at the quoted bid (for sell trades) or quoted ask price (for buy trades). This 
(partially) explains why small trades on SET are associated with large negative price changes 
compared to small trades on U.S. markets.  
The results of the present study empirically support Hypothesis 1, which predicts that 
informed traders are concentrated among larger trade sizes. This study, therefore, contributes 
to the existing literature by showing that trading structures (i.e., pure limit order market or 
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fully anonymous market structure and markets with intermediaries) affect informed traders’ 
trade size choices. 
 
5.3.  Informed Traders’ Trade Size Choices Under Different Market Conditions  
Table 5 shows the percentage cumulative price change, percentage cumulative quote 
change, percentage of transactions, and percentage of trading volume for each of the seven 
trade size categories, classified by market conditions (i.e., bull market in Panel A and bear 
market in Panel B). Market conditions do not appear to have a clear impact on informed 
traders’ trade size choices. Panel A of Table 5 shows that the smallest trades (i.e., the less 
than 25th percentile trade size category) account for an estimated 34.6% (17.2%) of the 
cumulative price (quote) change and comprise 19.5% of the transactions and 1.2% of the 
volume. Trades in the 25th to 50th and 50th to 75th percentile categories produce a negative 
percentage cumulative price change. On the other hand, the largest four trade size categories 
(i.e., 75th to 90th, 90th to 95th, 95th to 99th, and 99th and higher percentiles) account for 127.9% 
(134.2%) of the cumulative stock price (quote) change and comprise 28.6% of the 
transactions and 81.2% of the volume. Therefore, in a rising (bull) market, the largest four 
trade size categories appear to play a disproportionately large role in the cumulative price 
change and quote change relative to their proportion of trades and volume in the sample. 
Similarly, the results shown in Panel B are consistent with the results shown in Panel A. In a 
falling (bear) market, the four largest size categories account for 194.6% (148.3%) of the 
cumulative stock price (quote) change and consist of 27.7% of the trades and 79.7% of the 
trading volume; therefore, these categories have a disproportionately larger proportion of the 
overall price (quote) change relative to their proportion of transactions or trading volume.  
The average trade sizes of the four largest categories in a bull market are much larger 
than the average trade sizes in a bear period. Rising (falling) markets are generally associated 
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with high (low) volume periods, and order break-up strategies under bullish (bearish) market 
conditions become less (more) beneficial, leading informed traders to use larger-sized trades 
on bull markets than on bear markets. Although it appears that informed traders always prefer 
larger trade sizes (i.e., 75th percentile and higher) in bull and bear markets, during a bull 
market, the average trade sizes for the four largest size categories are 34,424 shares, 70,383 
shares, 144,245 shares, and 425,307 shares, respectively, whereas, during a bear market, the 
corresponding average trade sizes are 26,356 shares, 53,219 shares, 109,686 shares, and 
335,329 shares, respectively. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicts 
that informed traders are more concentrated in larger-sized trades during a bullish market 
than during a bearish market. 
 
5.4.  Choice of Trade Sizes by Informed Traders: Multivariate Analysis 
A formal multivariate test is conducted to separate stealth trading from public 
information and trading volume, supplementing the univariate results shown in Tables 3 and 
5. Table 6 shows the coefficients and adjusted R-square of the regression23 of the percentage 
cumulative price change (Panel A) and the percentage cumulative quote change (Panel B) on 
dummy variables representing each of the seven trade size categories and the percentage of 
trades (Model 1) and percentage of volume (Model 2). The regression is pooled across all 73 
sample stocks. The regressions in each panel are run for the combined sample periods and 
separately for each of the two (bull or bear market) periods. The results of the equality tests 
of trade size dummy variables are also reported.  
According to the public information hypothesis, the coefficient on each trade size 
dummy variable should be 0, and the coefficient on the percentage of trades should be 1. The 
                                                 
23As in Barclay and Warner’s (1993) study, in order to reduce heteroskedasticity in the dependent 
variables (i.e., the percentage cumulative price change and the percentage cumulative quote change), 
the regression in the present study is based on weighted least squares, where the weight of each stock 
is the absolute cumulative price (or quote) change for that stock over the sample period.  
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results of Model 1 (see Table 6, Panel A) are not consistent with the public information 
hypothesis in all periods. The findings demonstrate that the percentage price changes are 
smaller than predicted by the public information hypothesis for less-than-median-sized trades 
(i.e., the first two smallest categories) and larger than predicted in the larger-than-median-
sized trades (i.e., the last five categories). In particular, for the four largest categories, the 
percentage price changes are much larger than the percentage of transactions: that is, the 
coefficients of the top four categories are larger than 1, while the coefficient of the 50th to 75th 
percentile dummy variable is 0.511. In addition, the results from the equality tests of trade 
size dummy variables show that the hypothesis that predicts the coefficient in the 50th to 75th 
percentile category is equal to the coefficient in the 75th to 90th percentile category can be 
rejected at the 0.054 level of significance. However, the hypotheses that predict that the 
coefficients of three pairs of the largest four categories’ dummies are equal (i.e., 75th–90th 
percentile = 90th–95th percentile, 90th–95th percentile = 95th–99th percentile, etc.) cannot be 
rejected at any conventional level of significance. These results imply that the four largest 
groups are the trade sizes most preferred by informed traders. This is consistent with the 
univariate results in Table 3 and confirms Hypothesis 1, which predicts that informed traders 
are concentrated among larger trade sizes under a pure limit order market. 
In Table 6, the results of Model 2 for the trading volume hypothesis also echo the 
results for the public information hypothesis (Model 1). The results for Model 2 (see Table 6, 
Panel A) are not consistent with the trading volume hypothesis in all periods. The results 
demonstrate that the percentage price changes are smaller than predicted by the trading 
volume hypothesis in the 0 to 25th percentile category, as represented by the statistically 
significant coefficient of -0.504, and larger than predicted in the four largest categories, as 
shown by the statistically significant coefficients of 0.854, 0.805, 0.912, and 0.710, 
respectively. In general, these results indicate that informed traders are concentrated in the 
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top quartile trade size (75th percentile and larger), which is consistent with the univariate 
results of Table 3 and support Hypothesis 1.  The effect on stock prices is supported more in 
the down period (bear market) than in the up period (bull market). The results for the down 
period resemble those for the pooled periods in terms of magnitude and significance of the 
dummy variable coefficients (see Table 6, Panel A). The coefficients for the up period are 
nearly all statistically insignificant. 
The results shown in Panel B are based on the percentage cumulative quote change as 
the dependent variable, and they are qualitatively similar to those shown in Panel A, where 
the percentage cumulative price change is the dependent variable. The results in Panel B 
concur with the univariate results of Table 3 and also confirm the robustness of using 
different measures for the impact of trades on stock prices and quotations. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This study examines stealth trading for 73 liquid stocks listed on SET, a pure limit 
order market where market makers are absent. As a result of market makers’ ability to detect 
informed trades, it may not be appropriate to apply the results of studies that examine stealth 
trading on U.S. markets, which have market makers, to a pure limit order market such as 
SET, which has no market makers. The present study hypothesizes that, unlike stealth trading 
on specialist (e.g., NYSE) or dealer (e.g., NASDAQ) markets, where medium-sized trades 
are most informed, in a pure limit order market, where there are no market makers who can 
screen out informed traders, informed traders tend to use relatively larger-sized trades. Using 
intraday trade and quote data for the 73 most-liquid stocks over two time periods with 
different market conditions, we find that the medium-to-large size trade groups (i.e., 75th to 
90th, 90th to 95th, 95th to 99th, and larger than the 99th percentiles) account for 168.4% 
(143.1%) of the cumulative stock price (quote) change and comprise 28.3% of the 
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transactions and 80.8% of the volume. This finding indicates that these trade groups play a 
disproportionately large role in the cumulative price change and quote change relative to their 
proportion of trades and volume in the sample. The existing results for U.S. markets show 
that informed traders employ trade sizes that are between the 50th and 95th percentiles 
(Barclay and Warner 1993) and the 40th and 90th percentiles (Chakravarty 2001). Therefore, 
these results support our hypothesis that on SET (i.e., a pure limit order market) informed 
traders are able to use larger-sized trades than those used by informed traders on U.S. markets 
(i.e., markets with market makers who are able to screen out informed traders).  
The present study also analyzes trading for 73 liquid stocks to discover whether 
informed traders’ trade size choices vary according to the market condition (i.e., bull or bear 
market). The results indicate that in a rising and falling market the four top trade size 
categories (i.e., 75th percentile and higher) play a disproportionately large role in the 
cumulative price change and quote change relative to their proportion of trades and volume in 
the sample. However, the average trade sizes for these four top categories in a rising market 
are much larger than the average trade sizes in a falling market. Therefore, the results show 
that informed traders use large-sized trades more frequently in a bullish market than in a 
bearish market, and they support the hypothesis that high trading volume in the bullish 
market helps informed traders camouflage their trades.  
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Overall Sample Characteristics 
 
This table contains the trading characteristics for 73 liquid stocks listed on SET from January 2002 to 
October 2002. The sample period is divided into two sub-periods: a bull market and a bear market. The 
first period (i.e., January 2002 to June 2002) is a bull market, while the second period (i.e., June 2002 to 
October 2002) is a bear market. 
 
 Bull Market Bear Market 
 Jan 24, 2002 – Jun 13, 2002 Jun 14, 2002 – Oct 14, 2002 
Number of Stocks 73 73 
Number of Trading Days 93 82 
Average Market Capitalization 
(million baht) 
12,901 13,024 
Volume-weighted Trade Price 
(baht) 
10.33 11.75 
Market Return 30.3% -24.2% 
Equally-weighted Return 53.7% –52.4% 
Minimum Stock Return 10.2% –255.2% 




Summary of Trading Characteristics by Trade Size 
 
This table contains the trading characteristics for 73 liquid stocks listed on SET from January 2002 to October 2002. The sample period is 
divided into two sub-periods: a bull market and a bear market. The first period (i.e., January 2002 to June 2002) is a bull market, while the 
second period (i.e., June 2002 to October 2002) is a bear market. The sample characteristics are divided based on trade size. The trade size 
categories are constructed in the following way: For each period and each firm, all trades are ordered by their size in shares. For each period, 
each firm’s trades are divided into the following seven percentile categories: less than P25, P25 to P50, P50 to P75, P75 to P90, P90 to P95, 








<25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-99 >99 <25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-99 >99
Average number of shares per trade 1,578 4,522 12,816 34,424 70,383 144,245 425,307 1,251 3,461 10,379 26,356 53,219 109,686 335,329
Median number of shares per trade 1,000 4,000 10,000 27,500 50,000 100,000 300,000 1,000 3,000 10,000 20,000 50,000 100,000 268,500






















Baht volume per trade (baht) 15,448 51,857 124,778 356,796 755,922 1,477,807 4,382,062 13,374 44,991 112,159 315,230 659,472 1,292,331 3,853,029
Number of trades 313,961 394,366 440,383 276,866 88,867 76,506 17,556 188,096 220,321 270,349 153,587 52,522 42,951 9,957
Daily number of trades 3,376 4,240 4,735 2,977 956 823 189 2,294 2,687 3,297 1,873 641 524 121
Baht volume of trades (million baht) 4,850 20,451 54,950 98,785 67,177 113,061 76,931 2,516 9,912 30,322 48,415 34,637 55,507 38,365
Daily baht volume of trades (million baht) 52 220 591 1,062 722 1,216 827 31 121 370 590 422 677 468
Number of shares traded (million shares) 496 1,783 5,644 9,531 6,255 11,036 7,467 235 763 2,806 4,048 2,795 4,711 3,339
Daily number of shares traded (million shares) 5 19 61 102 67 119 80 3 9 34 49 34 57 41
Bull Market Bear Market
(Jan 24, 2002 - Jun 13, 2002) (Jun 14, 2002 - Oct 14, 2002)
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Table 3 
Cumulative Price Change, Cumulative Quote Change, Trades, and Volume by Trade Sizes 
 
This table contains the mean percentage of the cumulative stock price change and the cumulative stock 
quote change, percentage of trades, and percentage of share volume by trade sizes. The sample consists of 
73 liquid Thai stocks with at least a 5% price change from January 2002 to October 2002. Trade sizes are 
divided into seven categories in the following way: For each firm, all trades are ordered by their size in 
shares, and each firm’s trades are divided into seven percentile categories (i.e., less than P25, P25–P50, 
P50–P75, P75–P90, P90–P95, P95–P99, and larger than P99).  The stock price change for a given trade is 
defined as the difference between that trade’s price and the previous trade’s price. The stock quote change 
for a current trade is defined as the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the subsequent trade less the 
quote midpoint in effect at the time of the current trade. For each stock, the percentage of cumulative 
price (quote) change for a trade of a given trade size is the sum of all stock price (quote) changes 
occurring in that trade size category divided by the total cumulative price (quote) change of that stock 
over the sample period. The weighted cross-sectional mean of the cumulative price (quote) change is 
computed and reported below, where the weights are the absolute value of the cumulative price (quote) 
change of each stock in the sample. The proportion of trade (volume) is the sum of all trades (volume) in 






















< P25 –49.7% –0.2% 502,057 19.7% 730.81 1.2% 
P0 – P25 –32.6% –44.9% 614,987 24.1% 2,545.95 4.2% 
P0 – P25 13.9% 1.8% 710,732 27.9% 8,450.15 13.9% 
P0 – P25 48.1% 34.0% 430,453 16.9% 13,578.85 22.3% 
P0 – P25 38.6% 40.0% 141,389 5.6% 9,049.87 14.9% 
P0 – P25 53.2% 48.5% 119,457 4.7% 15,746.76 25.9% 




Percentage Cumulative Price Change, Trades, and Volume by Trade Sizes from a 
U.S. Market 
 
This table contains the mean percentage of the cumulative stock price change, the percentage of trades, 
and percentage of share volume by trade sizes for the U.S. stock sample from Barclay and Warner (1993) 
(Panel A) and Chakravarty (2001) (Panel B). 
 
 
Percent of Trade Size 
Category Number of Shares 
Percentage 
Cumulative 
Price Change Trades Share Volume 
   
Panel A: Barclay and Warner (1993) 
 
  
Small 100 – 499 shares -2.3% 52.6% 12.1% 
     
Medium 500 – 900 shares 24.1% 19.6% 12.9% 
 1,000 – 1,900 shares 38.3% 15.2% 17.9% 
 2,000 – 4,900 shares 23.1% 8.1% 19.2% 
 5,000 – 9,900 shares 7.4% 2.9% 13.5% 
     
Large 10,000 shares up 9.5% 1.7% 24.4% 
     
Panel B: Chakravarty (2001)    
 
Small 100 – 499 shares -1.2% 39.8% 3.0% 
     
Medium 500 – 999 shares 30.9% 25.3% 7.6% 
 1,000 – 2,999 shares 16.4% 16.6% 13.3% 
 3,000 – 5,999 shares 23.6% 9.3% 17.0% 
 6,000 – 9,999 shares 6.2% 2.5% 7.7% 
     





Percentage Cumulative Price Change, Percentage Cumulative Quote Change, Trades, and 
Volume by Trade Sizes and Market Conditions 
 
This table contains the mean percentage of the cumulative stock price change and the cumulative stock quote 
change, percentage of trades, and percentage of share volume by trade sizes and market conditions. The sample 
consists of 73 liquid Thai stocks with at least a 5% price change from January 2002 to October 2002. The sample 
period is divided into two sub-periods; a bull market and a bear market. The first period (i.e., January 2002 to June 
2002) is a bull market and is shown in Panel A, while the second period (i.e., June 2002 to October 2002) is a bear 
market and is shown in Panel B. Trade sizes are classified into seven categories in the following way: For each firm, 
all trades are ordered by their size in shares, and each firm’s trades are divided into seven percentile categories (i.e., 
less than P25, P25–P50, P50–P75, P75–P90, P90–P95, P95–P99, or more than P99).  The stock price change for a 
given trade is defined as the difference between that trade’s price and the previous trade’s price. The stock quote 
change for a current trade is defined as the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the subsequent trade less the 
quote midpoint in effect at the time of the current trade. For each stock, the percentage of cumulative price (quote) 
change for a trade of a given trade size is the sum of all stock price (quote) changes occurring in that trade size 
category divided by the total cumulative price (quote) change of that stock over the sample period. The weighted 
cross-sectional mean of the cumulative price (quote) change is computed and reported below, where the weights are 
the absolute value of the cumulative price (quote) change of each stock in the sample. The proportion of trade 
(volume) is the sum of all trades (volume) in a given trade size category divided by the total number of trades 

























Panel A: Bull Market       
 < P25 34.6% 17.2% 313,961 19.5% 495 1.2%          1,578 
P25 – P50 -55.7% -63.6% 394,366 24.5% 1,783 4.2%          4,522 
P50 – P75 -6.9% 12.3% 440,383 27.4% 5,644 13.4%        12,816 
P75 – P90 22.2% 35.5% 276,866 17.2% 9,531 22.6%        34,424 
P90 – P95 26.1% 37.5% 88,867 5.5% 6,255 14.8%        70,383 
P95 – P99 51.3% 35.7% 76,506 4.8% 11,036 26.1%      144,245 
 > P99 28.3% 25.5% 17,556 1.1% 7,467 17.7%      425,307 
Panel B: Bear Market   
< P25 -104.4% -10.0% 188,096 20.1% 235 1.3%          1,251 
P25 – P50 -17.6% -34.2% 220,321 23.5% 763 4.1%          3,461 
P50 – P75 27.4% -4.1% 270,349 28.8% 2,806 15.0%        10,379 
P75 – P90 64.8% 33.2% 153,587 16.4% 4,048 21.7%        26,356 
P90 – P95 46.8% 41.5% 52,522 5.6% 2,795 14.9%        53,219 
P95 – P99 54.4% 55.8% 42,951 4.6% 4,711 25.2%      109,686 





Regression Analysis of the Percentage Cumulative Price Change, Percentage Cumulative 
Quote Change, Percentage of Trades, and Percentage of Volume by Trade Sizes and 
Market Conditions 
 
This table presents the coefficients and adjusted R-square values of the weighted least square regressions, with the 
dependent variable defined as the percentage of cumulative stock price change and the percentage of cumulative 
stock quote change. The equations estimated are as follows: 
sisiP99P99P95P95P90P90P75P75P50P50P25P25P0si PtradesDDDDDDDY ,,76543210, εββββββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= >−−−−−−  
sisiP99P99P95P95P90P90P75P75P50P50P25P25P0si PvolumeDDDDDDDY ,,76543210, εββββββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= >−−−−−−  
where Yi,s is the cumulative price change (Panel A) or the cumulative quote change (Panel B) of the trade size 
category i for stock s. DP0–P25, DP25–P50, DP50–P75, DP75–P90, DP90–P95, DP95–P99, or D>P99 are respectively dummy 
variables associated to trade size categories defined as the percentiles P0–P25, P25–P50, P50–P75, P75–P90, P90–
P95, P95–P99, or >P99 of trade size. Ptradesi,s or Pvolumei,s is the proportion of trade size category as the 
percentage of trades or volume. The weights are the absolute percentage cumulative price/quote changes over the 
corresponding sample periods. The equality test tests for the equality of each pair of trade size dummy coefficients. 
The figures in the equality test are the p-values of the test. 
 
Panel A: Percentage Cumulative Price Change     
 All Period  Up Period  Down Period 












Weighted Least Square Regression 
Independent Variable         
P0 – P25 –0.931*** –0.504***  –0.917   0.331  –0.927*** –1.049*** 
P25 – P50 –0.001   0.146  –1.283** –0.943*    0.922***   0.849*** 
P50 – P75   0.511**   0.564  –0.625 –0.521    1.360***   1.262*** 
P75 – P90   1.014***   0.854*  –0.059 –0.334    1.679***   1.605*** 
P90 – P95   1.186***   0.805**    0.834 –0.198    1.432***   1.450*** 
P95 – P99   1.362***   0.912*    1.137 –0.018    1.497***   1.501*** 
>P99   1.191***   0.710**    1.132 –0.172    1.220***   1.275*** 
Percent of Trades   2.252 –    6.285* –  –0.620 – 
Percent of Volume –   0.540  –   0.865  –   0.400 
Adjusted R2  0.030  0.030    0.000   0.000    0.390   0.390 
Equality Tests of Trade Size Dummy Coefficients 
Coefficients Tested         
β0  =  β1 0.025 0.084  0.702 0.117  0.000 0.000 
β1  =  β2 0.031 0.144  0.204 0.472  0.000 0.004 
β2  =  β3 0.054 0.330  0.288 0.784  0.014 0.012 
β3  =  β4 0.569 0.861  0.209 0.838  0.070 0.226 
β4  =  β5 0.455 0.693  0.552 0.764  0.563 0.690 






Panel B: Percentage Cumulative Quote Change       
 All Period  Up Period  Down Period 












Weighted Least Square Regression 
Independent Variable         
P0 – P25 -0.000 0.001  -0.285 0.167  0.158* -0.094* 
P25 – P50 -0.446** -0.439***  -0.936** -0.818**  -0.104 -0.221*** 
P50 – P75  0.020 0.040  -0.135 -0.076  0.165** 0.117 
P75 – P90  0.341** 0.376  0.195 0.127  0.406*** 0.521*** 
P90 – P95  0.400* 0.423*  0.537 0.174  0.340*** 0.577*** 
P95 – P99  0.485** 0.517*  0.537 0.138  0.458*** 0.744*** 
>P99  0.206 0.226  0.516 0.056  0.034 0.332*** 
Percent of trades -0.007 –  2.284 –  -1.414*** – 
Percent of volume – -0.149  – 0.222  – -0.411 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.040  0.010 0.010  0.350 0.340 
Equality Tests of Trade Size Dummy Coefficients 
Pair Tested         
β0  =  β1 0.099 0.077  0.333 0.081  0.020 0.244 
β1  =  β2 0.003 0.013  0.025 0.076  0.000 0.000 
β2  =  β3 0.066 0.088  0.373 0.678  0.003 0.000 
β3  =  β4 0.766 0.804  0.500 0.922  0.428 0.479 
β4  =  β5 0.589 0.594  1.000 0.931  0.082 0.030 
β5  =  β6 0.080 0.122  0.954 0.850  0.000 0.000 
*, **, and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
